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1Abstract
In 1990 Colombia replaced its traditional system of severance payments
with a new system of severance payments savings accounts (SPSAs). Al-
though severance payments often are justiﬁed on the grounds that they pro-
vide insurance against earnings loss, they also increase costs for employers
and distort employment decisions. The impact of severance payments de-
pends largely on how much of the costs to employers can be shifted to work-
ers. The theoretical analysis in this paper shows that, in contrast to a
traditional system of severance payments, the system of SPSAs facilitates
the shifting of severance payments costs to workers in the form of lower
wages. Empirical results using the Colombian National Household Surveys
indicate that the introduction of SPSAs shifted around 80% of the total sev-
erance payments contributions to wages and had a positive eﬀect on weekly
hours. Results using the 1997 Colombian Living Standards Measurement
Survey suggest that, although SPSAs in part replaced employer insurance
with self-insurance, SPSAs continue to play a consumption smoothing role
for the non-employed.
JEL Codes: E 2 ,H 2 ,J 3 ,J 6 .
Keywords: Distortions, Tax Shifting, Unemployment Insurance, Con-
sumption Smoothing, Crowding Out.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
In Latin America, much as in Europe, high severance payments and other
dismissal costs often are blamed for the rigidity of labor markets and for high
unemployment rates. At the same time, severance payments received upon
separation are workers’ main source of protection against temporary income
shocks during unemployment in Latin America because the UI system there
is not well developed. While some countries have UI systems, many do not,
and in countries with UI, coverage is incomplete.
The consensus among economists is that severance payments distort the
behavior of ﬁrms and workers and generate rigidities in the labor market. On
the ﬁrm side, government-mandated severance paid at the time of separation
distorts incentives to hire and ﬁre, when such schemes cannot be undone by
private transfers from workers to ﬁrms in the form of lower wages.1 As for
workers, severance payments probably increase reservation wages and reduce
exit rates out of unemployment.
Despite these possible distortions, severance payment and other social
insurance programs often are justiﬁed on the grounds that private insurance
markets may not exist because of problems of adverse selection and because
workers may not be able to self-insure by borrowing.2 Moreover, even if
workers are able to save for periods of non-employment, this may be less eﬃ-
cient than getting insurance from others; those who do not end up separating
from their jobs may ineﬃciently reduce today’s consumption. Studies for
developed countries in fact provide evidence of liquidity constraints on work-
ers and of failures in private insurance markets.3 Evidence from developing
countries also suggests failures in formal credit and insurance markets, justi-
fying the need for social insurance programs including severance payments.4
However, government-mandated severance payments in developing countries
1Lazear (1990) was the ﬁrst to propose that any government-mandated severance pay-
ment could be undone by a ‘voluntary’ transfer from workers to ﬁrms. Lazear also explains
why government-mandated severance payments may be hard to undo in practice.
2Bertola (1999) presents a model in which job security provisions provide insurance to
risk-averse workers and increase welfare, without necessarily reducing productive eﬃciency.
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) present a model in which UI not only improves risk sharing
but also increases output.
3See Hamermesh (1982), Zeldes (1989), Attanasio and Davis (1996), Gruber (1997),
and Browning and Crossley (2001).
4See Murdoch (1990), Deaton (1992), Paxson (1992), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993),
a n dT o w n s e n d( 1994, 1995).
3only apply to formal sector jobs, leaving workers in the large informal sector
uninsured with limited ability to smooth consumption.
In 1990, Colombia introduced a labor market reform that decreased sev-
erance payments in the formal sector with the goal of reducing distortions
and increasing insurance coverage. In particular, the reform introduced a
system of fully-funded Severance Payments Savings Accounts (SPSAs) for
formal workers hired after January 1, 1991. The SPSAs required employers
to deposit a percentage of wages into guaranteed individual accounts avail-
able to workers in the event of job separation.
This paper asks whether the introduction of SPSAs reduced distortions in
the labor market while continuing to play an insurance role. The theoretical
section of the paper uses a matching model to illustrate the eﬀects of a shift
from a traditional system of severance payments to a system of SPSAs. The
model shows that SPSAs facilitate the shifting of severance payments’ costs
to workers in the form of lower wages. Moreover, the more risk averse or
more imperfectly insured workers are, the larger the wage cut they are willing
to accept when SPSAs are introduced. SPSAs also reduce employment dis-
tortions in the labor market by partially neutralizing government-mandated
transfers.
The empirical part of the paper looks at wages and hours of work of for-
mal and informal workers (i.e., workers covered and not covered by severance
payments) who were hired before and after 1990. Using data from the Na-
tional Household Surveys (NHS) for 1988-96, I ﬁnd that the introduction of
SPSAs reduced the wages of covered workers hired after the implementation
of the reform by 6.5%; that is equal to 78% of the contribution made by
employers into the savings accounts. This result suggests that there was
additional shifting compared to the situation with traditional severance pay-
ments. Moreover, consistent with a reduction in labor costs per hour under
the new system, the results suggest an increase in employment measured by
weekly hours after the introduction of SPSAs.
In addition, using data from the Living Standards Measurement Survey
(LSMS) for 1997, I also examine the insurance role of the new system. While
SPSAs generate substantial shifting of government-mandated severance pay-
ments from ﬁrms to workers and reduce costs for employers, the new SPSA
system should provide insurance for non-employed workers in the form of
forced precautionary savings. The results for consumption expenditures in-
dicate that an increase of 1,000 pesos in severance payments increased the
consumption of non-employed heads of households by 240 pesos, for those
4hired both before and after the reform. Although the results suggest that
severance payments play a consumption smoothing role, the fact that each
peso of severance pay did not translate one-for-one into consumption suggests
that SPSAs crowd out other forms of insurance. Results on the impact of
the policy change on other forms of insurance suggest crowding out of in-kind
and monetary transfers from relatives, as well as of government-mandated
transfers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the in-
troduction of SPSAs in Colombia and contrasts SPSAs with Unemployment
Insurance Savings Accounts (UISAs).5 Section 3 presents a model illustrat-
ing the eﬀects of a change from a standard severance payments system to a
system of SPSAs. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence on the eﬀects
of SPSAs on wages, hours, and consumption. Section 5 concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
2.1 The Introduction of SPSAs in Colombia
In 1990 Colombia introduced a major labor market reform that changed its
system of severance payments. To understand the change, however, it is
important ﬁrst to understand the system of severance payments that was in
place prior to the reform. Prior to the 1990 labor market reform, the system
of severance payments in Colombia resembled the traditional system in many
countries, requiring employers to pay severance at the time of separation.
Before the reform, employers were required to provide severance pay equal
to one month per year worked, based on the salary at the time of separation
(speciﬁcally 8.3% of the salary). The exceptions were self-employed, family
workers, and workers in ﬁrms with less than ﬁve employees, and domestic
workers, who were entitled to only half of 8.3%.6 Moreover, the legislation
allowed covered workers to borrow from their severance pay for investments
in housing and education, by deducting the amount from the payment at
t h et i m eo fs e p a r a t i o n . 7 Prior to the reform, the loans were credited in
5For a discussion of UISA’s see Feldstein and Altman (1998) and Hopenhayn (2000).
6In practice, many workers are employed by ﬁrms that do not comply with labor
legislation and thus are not covered by severance payments. Employment in such informal
sector ﬁrms accounts for around 50% of total employment in Colombia.
7The total amount that could be borrowed was limited to the severance payments the
worker had earned up until that date.
5nominal terms and not appropriately adjusted for inﬂation. In a country like
Colombia with high rates of inﬂation, this accounted for a substantial extra
cost.8 On the other hand, ﬁrms about to go bankrupt could simply not pay
severance or could negotiate a package substantially below what was owed
in severance payments.
The 1990 reform introduced two major changes with respect to severance
payments. First, it reduced the amount of severance payments. Second, it
changed the traditional system into a system of severance payments savings
accounts (SPSAs) for new contracts. Two adjustments eﬀectively reduced
the amount of severance payments after the 1990 reform. First, employers
were no longer required to pay one month per year worked out of the salary
at the time of separation. Instead, they were now required to pay one month
per year worked based on the salary at each point in time. Since salaries
increase with tenure, this adjustment reduces severance payments. Second,
workers could continue to borrow from their severance, but the 1990 reform
introduced proper adjustments of the loans to inﬂation.
The most important change introduced by the reform was the system of
guaranteed SPSAs which replaced the traditional system of severance pay-
ments. In particular, the system of SPSAs automatically applied to any
new contract signed after January 1st, 1991. The new system required em-
ployers to make a monthly payment into an individual savings account for
each worker equal to 8.3% of salary at each point in time. The new sys-
tem also imposed ﬁnes of 12% of the severance payments on employers who
failed to make monthly deposits into individual accounts. Moreover, the
1990 reform established administrative agencies to monitor and invest the
money deposited into the individual accounts. The agencies were required
to insure that the accounts earned at least the average return on three-month
treasury bonds, based on an average determined by the Central Bank every
quarter. As before, employed workers were allowed to withdraw funds from
the individual savings accounts for investments into housing and education.
Also, unemployed workers and retired workers had unrestricted access to all
funds in their savings accounts.
The reform also established that the monthly contribution of 8.3% of the
salary had to be paid by the employer. But the fact that the SPSAs are
8According to Ocampo (1987), the fact that prior to the reform, loans were credited in
nominal terms implied an additional 35% of total severance payments in the manufacturing
sector. That is, according to Ocampo’s estimates, the improper crediting of loans raised
severance costs by an additional 2.9% of the yearly salary in the manufacturing sector.
6guaranteed may allow employers to shift part of the payment to workers in
the form of lower wages. When severance payments are guaranteed, workers
should be more willing to accept wage cuts to assume part of the costs of sev-
erance payments. Further, when workers pay for part of the severance cost
and are faced with liquidity constraints, the system replaces employer insur-
ance with self-insurance against temporary income shocks: workers reduce
consumption while employed to save for periods of non-employment.
2.2 Parallel between SPSAs, UI and UISAs
The system of SPSAs resembles traditional unemployment insurance, which
requires employers to pay a payroll tax contribution into a fund. However,
there are some basic diﬀerences. First, SPSAs and traditional UI diﬀer
in their degree of experience rating. Traditional UI systems often provide
“incomplete experience-rating [in the sense] that employers are not charged
the full UI costs of a layoﬀ” (Anderson and Meyer, 2000). SPSAs provide
full experience-rating, in the sense that workers receive exactly what is con-
tributed by employers into the accounts. Second, in traditional UI systems
workers receive monthly beneﬁts for a limited time. SPSAs, instead, allow
workers to withdraw all funds at once after a separation. Finally, unlike
the traditional UI system which deposits contributions into a general fund,
SPSA deposits go into guaranteed individual accounts with interest accruing
to workers. The ﬁrst feature of SPSAs reduces distortions compared to tra-
ditional UI. The second and third features increase the likelihood of private
transfers from workers to ﬁrms in the form of lower wages, causing workers
to internalize the cost of insurance.
The SPSA system is similar to the Unemployment Insurance Savings Ac-
counts system (UISA) proposed by Feldstein and Altman (1998) and Hopen-
hayn (2000). UISAs require employers to deposit a portion of workers’
wages into special accounts to be used in the event of unemployment. Pos-
itive balances in the accounts earn the return on risk-free assets; negative
balances either are charged that same rate or are forgiven. Positive balances
remaining at the end of the working life are turned into retirement income.
The advantage of this system, according to proponents, is that it in-
ternalizes the cost of unemployment beneﬁts, thus substantially improving
incentives to work, in contrast to the traditional unemployment insurance
system. The extent to which UISAs provide employer insurance, or self-
insurance, depends on the rate contributed by workers and employers into
7the accounts. At one extreme, when workers make all the contributions, the
system forces them to self-insure. At the other extreme, when employers
make the entire contribution, the resultant distortions are greatest unless the
costs can be oﬀset.
Similarly, as the rate of contributions by employers into the SPSAs falls,
employer insurance is replaced with self-insurance, and the incentives for
both ﬁrms and workers improve. At one extreme, when severance payments
are shifted fully to workers, there is no employer-insurance but rather forced
savings; distortions in the behavior of ﬁrms and workers disappear. At
the other extreme, when employers provide 100% of contributions to the
accounts, the system is closer to the traditional system of severance payments
which provides employer insurance and the distortionary eﬀects of severance
payments are larger.9
The next section examines whether the introduction of SPSAs encouraged
shifting severance payments from employers to workers in the form of lower
wages, and whether this helped to neutralize the distortions introduced by
government-mandated severance payments.
3 Theoretical Consequences of SPSAs
I explore the theoretical impact of introducing SPSAs using a matching
model. By including frictions and idiosyncratic shocks, this model allows
for endogenous separations and limited bonding possibilities. The model is
in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), but includes severance pay-
ments, the probability of bankruptcy, and allows for new jobs to be as good
as any other job. The model illustrates the eﬀects of severance payments on
wages and employment in the presence of risk-aversion.10
Firms have to pay a state-mandated severance payment, T,t ow o r k e r s
whenever there is a separation. These are pure transfers, rather than waste
9While employer insurance is better than self-insurance when workers are faced by
idiosyncratic shocks — because it allows risk to be pooled across workers who do and do
not separate from their jobs — self-insurance is clearly better when the shock occurs at the
level of the ﬁrm (such as ﬁrm bankruptcy). The optimal shifting rate depends on the
consumption smoothing gains of the old system over the new system as compared to the
distortions induced to ﬁrm and worker behavior under the old system.
10As in Bertola (1999), workers cannot transfer resources across periods and states
of nature, and consumption is equal to current labor income or income from severance
payments.
8going to third parties, and are received by workers who are dismissed or quit.
The only way for ﬁrms to avoid paying severance payments is to declare
bankruptcy, but not all ﬁrms are able to declare bankruptcy. In particular,
ﬁrms are unable to declare bankruptcy with probability ξ conditional on a
worker separation.11
There is free-entry, so the number of vacancies is determined by the con-
dition, V =0 , where V is the present discounted value of a vacancy. Firms
holding a vacancy have a ﬂow cost, C.I t t a k e s t i m e f o r ﬁrms and work-
ers to ﬁnd each other in the market; the matching occurs with a technology
m(v,u),w h e r ev denotes the number of job vacancies and u the stock of un-
employed. Thus, the arrival rate of job applicants is q(θ) and the arrival rate
of job oﬀers is θq(θ),w h e r eθ = v
u and q0(θ) < 0. Production depends on a
match-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t ,x, which comes from a distribution G(x) and may
change at each point in time with probability λ. Wages are determined by
Nash-bargaining and set to split the surplus in ﬁxed proportions as follows:
β(J(x) − (V − T)) = (1 − β)(W(x) − (U + u(T)),
where T is the severance payment transfer; u(T) is the worker’s utility out
of the severance payment, where u0(·) > 0 and u00(·) < 0; β is the bargaining
power of workers; and J(x), V, W(x),a n dU are the present discounted
values of a job with match productivity x, of a vacant job, of a worker with
match productivity x, and of an unemployed worker, respectively. The value
of the ﬁlled job is:
rJ(x)=x − w(x)+λ(Ex[J(x)] − J(x)),




J(x)g(x)dx + G(e x)(V − ξT),
and e x is the critical value of the match productivity that triggers a separation.
The value of a vacancy, of an employed worker, and of an unemployed worker
are:
rV = −C + q(θ)(Ex[J(x)] − V ),
11In a country like Colombia a substantial share of ﬁrms operate in the informal sector
and are not subject to severance payments. However, since these ﬁrms were not directly
aﬀected by the introduction of SPSAs, the model concentrates on the impact of SPSAs on
formal sector ﬁrms.
9rW(x)=u(w(x)) + λ(Ex[W(x)] − W(x)),
and
rU = θq(θ)(Ex[W(x)] − U),




W(x)g(x)dx + G(e x)(U + ξT).
The wage is obtained by substituting the value functions into the Nash-
bargaining condition:12
(1 − β)u(w)+βw = β (x + θC)+( θq(θ)+r)[(1− β)u(T)+βT].
The wage equation shows that government-mandated severance payments
raise the wage in the formal sector because they increase the value of an
unemployed worker. In addition, while the bankruptcy probability does
not enter directly into the wage equation, it does raise the labor tightness
parameter, θ, and increases the wage the ﬁrm has to pay.13
For completeness, the equilibrium is determined by solving for the job de-
struction (JD) condition, which is given by a separation rule, and for the job
creation (JC) condition, which is given by the free-entry condition (see the
Appendix for details). Figure 1.a shows that a reduction in state-mandated
severance payments increases job destruction rates, λG(e x), and has an am-
biguous eﬀect on job creation rates, θq(θ).F i g u r e 1.b shows the impact
of a reduction in severance payments on unemployment when job creation
rates increase. Although the ﬁgure shows the case where unemployment
is unchanged, the eﬀects on employment and unemployment are generally
ambiguous.
The next section illustrates how the introduction of a system of SPSAs,
like a reduction in state-mandated severance payments, reduces wages but
has ambiguous eﬀects on employment, while still providing insurance for
workers.
12See Appendix for details.
13Garibaldi and Violante (1999) construct a matching model with unlimited bonding
possibilities, where severance payments have no impact on the labor market. This is
because in the Garibaldi and Violante (1999) model, workers cannot move directly from
unemployment into jobs higher up the ladder and, thus, their framework assumes that the
value of the unemployed is not aﬀected by severance payments.
103.1 The Introduction of SPSAs
The replacement of severance payments at the time of separation with a
system of SPSAs essentially turns severance payments from ﬁxed one-time
costs into variable costs like a payroll tax. Instead of paying the amount T at
t h et i m eo fs e p a r a t i o n ,ﬁrms now contribute a portion t of wages every period
into the severance payments savings accounts. The fact that severance
payments now are a per-period payment guaranteed for the future, instead
of a ﬁxed transfer from ﬁrms to workers paid upon separation, facilitates
shifting severance payments towards workers in the form of lower wages.
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and the value of a vacancy, value of an employed, and value of an unemployed
continue to be as before. Now the payment is received with certainty upon
separation though and the amount the worker gets at the time of separation





As before, wages are determined by Nash-bargaining, but now the ﬁrm’s
surplus is lower and the condition modiﬁed:
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14The main similarities and diﬀerences between SPSA and traditional UI systems can
be seen in the context of the model. Under traditional UI systems ﬁrms contribute
wt,w h e r et will be a function of past separations of the ﬁrm. However, the amount
received by the worker upon separation will be πwt
max[θq(θ),(
1
s)],w h e r eπ is a fraction of total
contributions indicating the incomplete experience-rating and s is the maximum length of
the unemployment spell for which the worker is entitled to UI.
11These wages are lower than under the standard severance payment system
because now workers are willing to pay for part of the severance payments
costs in the form of lower wages. There are a number of reasons why workers
are willing to accept lower wages when there are severance payments savings
accounts. First, workers will receive the present discounted value of the
foregone wages in the future because the interest rate on the savings accrues
to them. Second, under the traditional system ﬁrms only pay severance
when there is a separation and the ﬁrm has not declared bankruptcy, but
under the system of SPSAs the ﬁrm pays no matter what.
The wage equation above also shows that the more risk-averse or more
imperfectly insured workers are, the larger the wage cut they will be willing to
take when SPSAs are introduced. This is because, although the traditional
system is better at insuring against idiosyncratic shocks, it leaves workers
completely unprotected against ﬁrm bankruptcy. In contrast, the system of
SPSAs is better at insuring against ﬁrm-level shocks (e.g., ﬁrm bankruptcy),
but does not leave workers without protection against idiosyncratic shocks.
Consequently, risk-averse workers are willing to pay the actuarially fair insur-
ance premium (implicitly through lower wages) to insure against ﬁrm-level
shocks when SPSAs are introduced.
Figures 2.a and 2.b show the impact of SPSAs on employment. The
introduction of SPSAs, like a reduction in severance payments, shifts the JC
and JD curves to the right. The introduction of SPSAs thus generates similar
eﬀects to a reduction in severance payments: an increase in job destruction
rates, but ambiguous eﬀects on job creation rates and unemployment.
To summarize, the analysis shows that the introduction of SPSAs fa-
cilitates the shift of severance payments to workers in the form of lower
wages and that higher degrees of risk-aversion make possible larger wage
cuts. Moreover, while the switch from the traditional system to the system
of SPSAs essentially turns employer insurance into self-insurance, both sys-
tems play a consumption smoothing role. However, the results show that
SPSAs have ambiguous eﬀects on employment and unemployment. In addi-
tion, although the reduction in the ﬁxed costs of employment should reduce
hours of work, the reduction in wages attributable to shifting should increase
hours of work.
124 Empirical Evidence on the Eﬀects of SP-
SAs
This section uses data from the Colombian National Household Surveys to
evaluate the eﬀects on wages and hours of work of the switch from the tra-
ditional system of severance payments to the system of SPSAs introduced in
1990. The Living Standards Measurement Survey then is used to examine
the impact of the change on consumption.
4.1 The Eﬀects of SPSAs on Wages and Hours of Work
4.1.1 The National Household Surveys
The analysis for wages and hours of work uses data from the June Surveys
of the National Household Surveys (NHS) for the years 1988, 1992, and
1996. These data are useful because the NHS covers the periods both before
and after the reform, allowing me to exploit the temporal variation in the
legislation.
In June, the NHS includes questions about employment in the formal
sector (i.e., taxable and covered by regulations) and the informal sector (i.e.,
not taxed and essentially unregulated). Since employers who comply with
one part of labor legislation are likely to comply with all elements of labor
legislation, the NHS uses information on whether the employer made social
security contributions as a proxy for whether an employee is a formal worker.
This variable is then used to identify whether workers were covered by sev-
erance pay legislation. The June surveys also include information on tenure
which can be used to identify who was hired before and after the reform and
to distinguish between workers covered by traditional severance payments
and those covered by SPSAs.
To determine the eﬀect of SPSAs on wages, I use the log of real hourly
wages as the dependent variable. This variable is constructed by dividing
weekly wages in the main job by the average number of hours worked per
week, then deﬂating to 1998 prices using the consumer price indexes by city.
The CPIs come from the National Department of Statistics for June of 1988,
1992, and 1996. The controls used in the hourly wage and weekly hours
regressions include dummies for sex and marital status; education dummies
for primary, secondary, high-school degree, university, and postgraduate ed-
13ucation; potential experience and potential experience squared;15 tenure and
tenure squared; year dummies; a formal or severance pay coverage dummy
(constructed as described above); ﬁrm size dummies for ﬁrms between 2-
5e m p l o y e e s ,ﬁrms between 5-10e m p l o y e e s ,a n dﬁrms with more than 10
employees; and eight industry dummies and six city dummies (the data in-
cludes information on the seven largest metropolitan areas in Colombia, i.e.,
Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Bogotá, Manizales, Medellin, Cali, and Pasto).
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis for
the three survey years, by severance pay coverage status.
4.1.2 Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences Speciﬁcation
To examine the eﬀect on hourly wages and weekly hours of the change from
the traditional system to a system of SPSAs, the estimation exploits temporal
and cross-sectional variation. The temporal variation comes from comparing
the pre- and post-1990 periods. The cross-sectional variation comes from two
sources: (1) comparing workers covered and not covered by severance pay
legislation (i.e., formal and informal sector workers); and (2) comparing those
hired before and after 1990 in the formal sector during the post-reform period
(i.e., those covered by the traditional severance pay system and those covered
by SPSAs). The following regression provides diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences estimates of the eﬀects of switching from the traditional severance
pay system to the system of SPSAs:
ln Yit = α + β1Xit + β2Ti + β3di92 + β4di92 + β5SPi + β6Ti * di92
+β7Ti * di96 + β8Ti * SPi + β9SPi * di92 + β10SPi * di96
+β11SPi * POST90t * SHORT TENUREi + εit, (1)
where the dependent variable is either the log of hourly wages or the log of
weekly hours, Xit is a vector of covariates, Ti are the tenure variables, di92
and di96 are year dummies, SPi is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
person was covered by severance pay legislation either before or after the
reform, POST90t takes the value of 1 for individuals observed after 1990
and 0 for individuals observed before 1990, and SHORT TENUREi is a
variable which takes the value of one for those with short tenures (less than
15This experience variable was constructed in the standard way as age minus years of
education minus 6.
146 years when comparing 1990 to 1996, and less than 2 years when comparing
1990 to 1992). The tenure variables control for time-invariant diﬀerences
in wages and hours of work attributable to the eﬀects of ﬁrm-speciﬁch u -
man capital and other factors (β2); the year dummies control for time-series
changes in wages and hours of work (e.g., macroeconomic shocks) aﬀect-
ing all workers (β3and β4); and the severance pay dummy controls for any
time-invariant factors aﬀecting workers covered by severance pay legislation
(β5). The second-level interactions control for time-varying eﬀects of tenure
(β6 and β7), the time-invariant eﬀects of tenure on workers covered by sev-
erance pay legislation (β8), and the changes over time for workers covered
by severance pay legislation whether hired before or after 1991 (β9 and β10).
The third-level interaction (β11) captures all variation in wages and hours of
work speciﬁc to treatment workers, hired after 1991 (i.e., observed after 1990
a n dw i t hl e s st h a n2y e a r so ft e n u r ei n1992 and less than six years of tenure
in 1996) relative to the controls hired before 1991 (i.e., observed before 1990
or observed after 1990 but with more than 2 years of tenure in 1992 and more
than six years of tenure in 1996), and covered by severance pay legislation
relative to those not covered by severance pay legislation. These coeﬃcients
are the DDD estimates of the eﬀects on wages and hours of work of switching
from the traditional severance payments system to the system of SPSAs.
If there was no shifting under the old system, full shifting of the costs of
severance payments costs to workers after the introduction of SPSAs would
imply a coeﬃcient β11 of -0.083; this corresponds to the 8.3% of wages de-
posited by employers into the individual savings accounts. An insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient on the third-level interaction instead would imply that the guaran-
teed individual savings accounts did not change the incentives for ﬁrms and
workers to establish voluntary contracts to neutralize government-mandated
severance payments. In the hours regression, a negative (positive) coeﬃcient
would imply that the reduction in ﬁxed costs was more (less) important than
the reduction in variable labor costs, and an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient would
indicate that the two eﬀects cancel each other out.
4.1.3 Results
Panel A of Table 2 presents the estimates of the third-level interaction, β11,
from the wage regression. The ﬁrst three columns show the results for the
entire sample, while columns (4)-(6) present the results for the sample of
permanent workers and columns (7)-(9) present the results for the sample
15of temporary workers. Column (1) presents results without any controls,
except for ﬁxed eﬀects and second-level interactions. These are equivalent
to diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates calculated from simple
comparisons of means. Columns (2) and (3) show the results of controlling
for observables that aﬀect wages. The coeﬃcient for all workers shown in
the ﬁrst row of Column (3) indicates that wages fell 4.2% for workers hired
after 1990 and thus covered by SPSAs. This is equivalent to a shift of 50.6%
of the total contribution made by employers into the accounts. If there had
been no shifting at all under the old system, then this estimate would imply
less than full shifting. However, since there could already have been some
shifting under the traditional severance payments system, it may be more
appropriate to interpret this as additional shifting of severance payments
after the introduction of the system of SPSAs. Moreover, if workers value
some employer insurance, they may be unwilling to change to a system of
self-insurance altogether by accepting full shifting of the severance payments
costs.
The next two rows separate the eﬀects in 1992 from those in 1996. While
the wages of workers covered by SPSAs are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
those of workers not covered in 1992, the wages of covered workers were lower
than those of uncovered workers by 6.5% in 1996. This is probably because
by 1996 enough time had elapsed for employers to hire under the new system.
The 1996 results indicate a shift equivalent to 78% of the total contributions
made by employers, which is closer to full shifting.16
The next six columns present results for the separate samples of per-
manent and temporary workers. Since temporary workers are not entitled
to severance payments, the reform should not have generated shifting for
temporary workers. Columns (4)-(6) show consistently negative eﬀects for
16The only other empirical examination on the incidence of severance payments on
wages is the work by Bertola (1990). Bertola (1990) uses aggregate data and ﬁnds that,
contrary to insider-outsider theories, wages are lower in countries with higher severance
pay. Related work on the incidence of UI and other payroll taxes and mandated beneﬁts
on wages are also broadly consistent with the ﬁndings in this section. Anderson and
Meyer (1997) ﬁnd substantial shifting of UI market-level taxes to workers in the form of
lower earnings. A subsequent study by Anderson and Meyer (2000), which exploits the
introduction of experience rating in Washington state in 1984, ﬁnds that UI market-level
taxes are largely passed on to workers in the form of lower earnings. Using worker-level
data and temporal as well as cross-section variation in ﬁrms’ costs, Gruber (1994) and
Gruber and Krueger (1991)a l s oﬁnd that most of the costs of mandated maternity health
beneﬁts and workers’ compensation are shifted to workers as lower wages.
16permanent workers, although less precise than for the entire sample. On
the other hand, Columns (7)-(9) show positive or negative but insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients for temporary workers.
Panel B in Table 2 shows the eﬀects on weekly hours of the switch from a
traditional system of severance payments to a system of SPSAs. As indicated
above, the decrease in the ﬁxed cost of employment caused by the change from
a one-time payment at separation to a per-period payment should reduce
weekly hours. On the contrary, the reduction in hourly wages found in
Panel A should increase weekly hours. The estimates for all workers show
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of SPSAs on weekly hours, indicating that the
later eﬀect dominates. As for wages, the eﬀects are greater in 1996 than
in 1992. When the sample is separated, the eﬀects on permanent workers
are positive and signiﬁcant while the eﬀects on temporary workers are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Potential Composition Biases
The results in Table 2 may be subject to composition biases. If as the
model predicts formal ﬁrms are less likely to retain unproductive matches
after the reform, then the results in Table 2 may underestimate the shifting
generated by SPSAs and may generate a positive bias on hours of work.
Kugler (1999) suggests that the reform increased turnover by about 1%, so it
is possible that such a downward bias exists. On the other hand, if low skill
workers are more likely to be covered by severance pay legislation after the
reform because there is more hiring after the reform, the results in Table 2
could overestimate the shifting generated by the introduction of SPSAs and
generate a downward bias on weekly hours.
Table 1 suggests that the distribution of observable characteristics
changed similarly between the pre- and post-reform periods in the covered
and uncovered sectors and the change was towards an improvement in the
composition of the workforce in both sectors (e.g., higher education). In
addition, the hourly wages of uncovered workers in the upper quarter of the
distribution were close to the median hourly wage of covered workers dur-
ing the pre-reform period (i.e., 168 pesos versus 157 pesos in 1988 terms),
suggesting that the movement of marginal workers from the uncovered to
the covered sector is unlikely to account for the observed reduction in wages
of newly hired covered workers during the post-reform period. Finally, the
weak explanatory power of the observables in a regression of the third-level
interaction term suggests that composition biases are unlikely to be very
17important.17 Moreover, the results from this regression indicate that, if
anything, more skilled workers are more likely to be hired after the reform
in the covered sector, thus suggesting that the results in Table 2 probably
underestimate the extent of shifting and generate a positive bias in the hours
regression.
4.2 SPSAs and Consumption
As discussed above, if severance payments are shifted to workers as lower
wages then there are implications in terms of whether insurance is employer
or worker provided. The analysis above suggests at least partial shifting
of severance payments to workers and indicates that part of the employer
insurance under the old system was replaced by self-insurance after the in-
troduction of SPSAs. The empirical analysis that follows examines the
consumption smoothing role of severance payments under the old system
and under the new system of SPSAs.
4.2.1 Living Standards Measurement Survey
U s i n gd a t af r o mt h e1997 Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), I
analyze the eﬀects of severance payments on the consumption of those sub-
ject to the traditional severance pay system versus those subject to SPSAs.
Although the temporal variation in the legislation cannot be exploited to
examine the eﬀects on consumption because the LSMS only has been con-
ducted once in Colombia, the data allows comparing workers who received
and did not receive severance payments and workers likely to have been hired
before and after 1990. The survey does not include information on tenure
in the current job, but it does allow for measuring experience and using it as
a proxy for whether the worker was hired before or after the reform.
The Colombian LSMS has the beneﬁto fp r o v i d i n gaw e a l t ho fi n f o r m a t i o n
on household consumption of necessities and non-necessities. The monthly
consumption variable is constructed by adding monthly expenditures on food
and beverages at home and away from home, transportation, cleaning, en-
tertainment, clothing, furniture, electronic devices, car services and parts,
jewelry, utilities, and rent and mortgage. In addition, the LSMS allows for
constructing measures of other forms of insurance including in-kind and mon-
17The R2 in this regression is around 0.1.
18etary transfers from relatives and other transfers, such as disability insurance
and workers’ compensation insurance against work injuries.
In addition to the detailed consumption information, the LSMS also in-
cludes information on whether individuals received severance payments. The
consumption regressions are estimated for heads of households and include
the following controls: dummies for sex and marital status, education, age,
number of persons in the household, monthly income of the household, and
seven dummies for region.18 Table 3 presents summary statistics of the
various variables by receipt of severance pay.
4.2.2 Consumption Speciﬁcation: Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
Since the LSMS data is only available for 1997, it is not possible to exploit
the temporal variation when analyzing the eﬀect of severance payments on
consumption, in contrast to the analysis on wages. The analysis for con-
sumption instead exploits variation in severance payments and variation in
coverage by the traditional severance pay system and SPSAs during the post-
reform period (i.e., hired before or after 1990). The following consumption
regression is estimated for heads of households:
Ci = δ + ϕ1Zi + ϕ2Ei + ϕ3MSPi + ϕ4MSPi X POST90HIREi + υi, (2)
where the dependent variable is the monthly consumption level of necessities
and non-necessities for a household with head i, Zi is a vector of household-
speciﬁc and head-speciﬁcc o v a r i a t e s ,Ei is potential experience of the head,19
MSPi is monthly severance payments, and POST90HIREi is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 if the person entered the labor market (and thus
was hired) after 1990 and 0 if the person entered the market prior to 1990.
A test of whether each peso of severance payments is translated one-for-
one into consumption (i.e., ϕ3 =1 ), provides evidence on the eﬀectiveness of
severance payments as a form of insurance rather than simply as replacement
for other forms of insurance. Moreover, a test of whether the marginal
propensity to consume out of severance payments is smaller for those hired
under the system of SPSAs (i.e., ϕ4 < 0) is a test of whether the system of
SPSAs provides less consumption smoothing than the traditional system of
18These controls are very similar to those included in other analyses of consumption
(e.g., Gruber, 1997, 1998; Hamermesh,1982).
19The experience variable is constructed as current age minus the age at which the ﬁrst
job was held.
19severance payments. These regressions are run both for the sample of non-
employed heads and for the sample of employed heads alone. The regressions
on the sample of non-employed heads allow for assessing whether increasing
severance payments to a non-employed head relative to another increases his
relative consumption (i.e., ϕ3 > 0). This is in the spirit of the analysis by
Gruber (1997, 1998), who examines the consumption smoothing beneﬁts of
unemployment insurance.20
4.2.3 Do SPSAs Smooth Consumption?
The results of estimating equation (2) are presented in Table 4. Panel A
presents the results for the sample of non-employed heads. Panel B shows
the results for the sample of employed heads only. An increase of 1,000 pe-
sos in severance payments increases consumption by about 240 pesos. The
interaction with the post-1990 hire dummy indicates that severance pay-
ments deposited into savings accounts do not provide more or less insurance
for non-employed heads than the traditional system of severance payments.
However, the results in Panel B suggest that there is less consumption among
employed heads covered by SPSAs. This indicates that SPSAs essentially
turn employer insurance into self-insurance by generating forced savings from
lower consumption during employment and by increasing consumption dur-
ing periods of non-employment.
The rest of Table 4 presents similar results for diﬀerent measures of con-
sumption, including food at home, food away from home, entertainment,
clothing, housing services, housing durables, utilities, and mortgage and rent
payments. The consumption smoothing eﬀect of severance payments is
20The main diﬀerence between this analysis and Gruber’s is that, since there are no
household panel data sets for Colombia, this analysis relies on a cross-section and examines
the eﬀect of severance payments on the consumption levels of the non-employed. Further,
Gruber uses as a regressor unemployment insurance replacement rate eligibility rather than
actual UI beneﬁts received to avoid the problem of potential endogeneity of UI receipts.
The present analysis instead uses variation in severance payments received, which is driven
by employment in the formal or informal sector, by type of worker (i.e., family worker,
self-employed, domestic worker, or wage earner), by type of contract (i.e., permanent or
temporary), and by diﬀerences in previous earnings levels. Since higher wage earners
and higher income individuals are likely to save more and to suﬀer a smaller consumption
drop during non-employment, there could be upward biases in the estimates of ϕ3 and
ϕ4. The analysis here, however, controls for household income (including, earnings) in the
consumption regressions and this should mitigate these upward biases.
20greater for necessities (i.e., food at home, utilities, and housing services)
than for non-necessities (i.e., food away from home, entertainment, clothing,
and housing durables).21 Also, as with total consumption, consumption of
both necessities and non-necessities drops during employment and rises dur-
ing non-employment after the introduction of SPSAs. This indicates that
employed workers self-insure by saving for non-employment.
The results in Table 4 indicate that each additional peso of severance
payments translates much less than one-for-one into consumption. So,
severance payments may be crowding out other forms of insurance against
non-employment. Table 5 presents evidence on the eﬀects of severance pay-
ments on in-kind and monetary transfers from relatives, on other government-
mandated transfers (such as disability insurance and workers’ compensation
insurance against work injuries), and on wealth ﬂows (including interest pay-
ments on loans, savings accounts, and treasury bonds; dividends on stocks;
and income ﬂows from lease or sale of property).
In-kind transfers from relatives appear to be crowded out for non-
employed heads by severance payments deposited into savings accounts. In
particular, an increase of 1,000 pesos in severance payments reduces the value
of in-kind transfers by 43 pesos. Moreover, the results suggest that mone-
tary transfers from relatives are crowded out by severance payments during
non-employment, specially after SPSAs are introduced. While an increase of
1,000 pesos in severance payments provided by the employer reduces transfers
from relatives by 18 pesos, the same increase in severance payments provided
by forced savings reduces transfers from relatives by about 685 pesos. There
is also evidence for employed workers after the reform of crowding out of
other government-mandated transfers. This may reﬂect more policing by
employers in the provision of other beneﬁts when they cannot avoid paying
severance by declaring bankruptcy or because of economic diﬃculties. Fi-
nally, there is no evidence of crowding out of wealth ﬂows.22 At the mean
levels of transfers and severance pay in our sample, these ﬁndings are sugges-
tive of substantial crowding out of family and other transfers by severance
payments.23
21This is consistent with Gruber’s (1998) evidence using the PSID, who ﬁnds that UI
plays a greater role in smoothing consumption of necessities than of non-necessities.
22The data, however, does not allow to measure wealth stocks and to examine the eﬀect
of severance payments on wealth.
23The apparent crowdout of transfers from relatives and other government-mandated
transfers contrasts with the ﬁndings in Gruber (1998) showing no crowdout of these types
215C o n c l u s i o n
This paper assesses the impact of the introduction of a system of severance
payments savings accounts (SPSAs) in Colombia after the 1990 Labor Mar-
ket Reform. A similar system of unemployment insurance savings accounts
h a sb e e np r o p o s e db yF e l d s t e i na n dA l t m a n( 1998) and Hopenhayn (2000) to
reduce the distortionary eﬀects of unemployment insurance beneﬁts. How-
ever, even though savings accounts systems have less distortionary eﬀects on
the labor market, they substitute employer insurance with self-insurance.
The Colombian case oﬀers a unique opportunity to study the labor mar-
ket consequences of savings accounts. The paper ﬁrst theoretically exam-
ines whether the introduction of guaranteed savings accounts allow private
transfers from workers to ﬁrms to neutralize government-mandated severance
payments. The theory suggests that, in contrast to the traditional severance
pay system, the system of SPSAs facilitates shifting the costs of severance
payments to workers in the form of lower wages, reducing distortion in the
labor market. The analysis also shows that the more workers require in-
surance or the more risk-averse they are the larger is the eﬀect of SPSAs on
shifting.
Next, the paper turns to an empirical examination of the eﬀects on wages
of the introduction of SPSAs in Colombia. Do SPSAs allow ﬁrms to shift part
of the severance payments to workers as lower wages? The results suggest
that the introduction of SPSAs shifted around 80% of ﬁrms’ contributions
into the accounts towards workers as lower wages. This shifting of severance
payments towards workers should have reduced costs for employers as well
as employment distortions. The results show an increase in hours of work
after the introduction of SPSAs for those workers aﬀected by the reform.
The analysis of wages indicates at least partial shifting of severance pay-
ments to workers and suggests that employer insurance was replaced partly
by self-insurance after the introduction of SPSAs. While employer insur-
ance is better than self-insurance when workers face idiosyncratic shocks —
because it allows for pooling risk across workers who do and do not separate
from their jobs —, self-insurance is clearly an improvement when the shocks
occur at the level of the pooling universe (for example, ﬁrm bankruptcy).
T h ee v i d e n c eo nt h ee ﬀects of the system of SPSAs on consumption in-
dicates that an increase of 1,000 pesos in severance payments raises con-
of transfers by UI.
22sumption expenditures by 240 pesos during periods of non-employment, both
before and after the introduction of SPSAs. Moreover, the reduction in con-
sumption during periods of employment, and the increase in consumption
during periods of non-employment for those hired after the reform, suggests
that by inducing forced savings the system of SPSAs continues to play a
consumption smoothing role. The results also suggest, though, that each
additional peso of severance payments translates into much less than one
peso of increased consumption; this suggests a crowding out of other forms
of insurance. Severance payments indeed appear to crowd out other sources
of insurance, in particular, in-kind and monetary transfers from relatives and
other government-mandated transfers.
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27Appendix
Derivation of Wage Equation under Traditional System of Severance
Payments:
First, simplify the value of a ﬁlled job and an employed worker to
substitute into the Nash-bargaining condition. Substituting the free-
entry condition into the value of a vacancy, I can solve for the expected





and substituting this into the value of a ﬁlled job,
J(x)=









Substituting J(x) and W(x) into the Nash-bargaining condition,
(1 − β)u(w)+βw = βx +
βλC
q(θ)
− (1 − β)λ[ExW(x) − U]
+(1− β)rU +( r + λ)[(1− β)u(T)+βT].
To get [ExW(x) − U] integrate the Nash-bargaining condition over all


















28Now, [ExW(x) − U] and U can be substituted into the wage equation
above simplifying to the following expression,
(1 − β)u(w)+βw = β (x + θC)+( θq(θ)+r)[(1− β)u(T)+βT].
Derivation of JD Curve under a Traditional System of Severance Pay-
ments:
After shocks are realized and wages set, the ﬁrm and worker decide
to separate if their joint surplus becomes negative, i.e., if the match-
speciﬁc productivity falls below a critical value e x.C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e
job destruction (JD) condition is given by the following separation rule:
(J(e x) − (V − T)) + (W(e x) − (U + u(T))) = 0.
Substituting the Nash-bargaining into the separation rule,
J(e x)=−T,











βC−(θq(θ)+r)(1− β)u(T)+(λ − θq(θ))βT+(1 − β)u(w)=0 .
The slope of the JD curve is obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the









































So, the JD curve has a positive slope.
To show that a decrease in T shifts the JD curve to the right, to-
tally diﬀerentiate the JD condition above with respect to T holding θ
constant,
−(θq(θ)+r)((1 − β)u



















(θq(θ)+r)u0(T)+( r + λ)u0(w)
u0(w)
< 0.
Derivation of JC Curve under a Traditional System of Severance Pay-
ments:


















This condition determines de JC relation in (x,θ) space.
30The slope of the JC curve is obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the
above condition with respect to e x,
−(1 − ξ)Tg(e x) −





















where D1 = [(1−G(e x))q(θ)2βC+(q(θ)+θq0(θ))((1−β)u(T)+βT)+((1−β)u0(w)+β)rCq0(θ)]
(r+λ)((1−β)u0(w)+β)q(θ)2 .
The JC curve is thus always downward sloping.
To show that a decrease in T shifts the JD curve to the right, to-
tally diﬀerentiate the JD condition above with respect to T,h o l d i n gθ
constant,

























Figure 1.a shows the job destruction and job creation curves in (x,θ)
space. Figure 1. bs h o w st h ej o bc r e a t i o nc u r v e sa n dt h eB e v e r i d g e
curves (BC) in (u,v) space, where the Beveridge curve is obtained
from the following steady state condition:
λG(e x)(1− u)=θq(θ)u.
31Derivation of Wage Equation under SPSA’s System:
First, simplify the value of a ﬁlled job and an employed worker to
substitute into the Nash-bargaining condition. Substituting the free-
entry condition into the value of a vacancy, I can solve for the expected





and substituting this into the value of a ﬁlled job,
J(x)=









Substituting J(x) and W(x) into the Nash-bargaining condition,
(1 − β)u(w)+βw(1 + t)=βx +
βλC
q(θ)
− (1 − β)λ[ExW(x) − U]
+(1− β)rU +( r + λ)(1− β)u(T).
To get [ExW(x) − U] integrate the Nash-bargaining condition over all


















Now, [ExW(x) − U], U,a n dwt c a nb es u b s t i t u t e di n t ot h ew a g ee q u a -
tion above simplifying to the following expression,
(1 − β)u(w)+βw = β (x + θC)+(θq(θ)+r)(1− β)u(T)−β (λG(e x)+r)T.
32Derivation of JD Curve under SPSA’s System:
After shocks are realized and wages set, the ﬁrm and worker decide
to separate if their joint surplus becomes negative, i.e., if the match-
speciﬁc productivity falls below a critical value e x.C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e
job destruction (JD) condition is given by the following separation rule:
(J(e x) − V )+( W(e x) − (U + u(T))) = 0.
Substituting the Nash-bargaining into the separation rule,
J(e x)=0 ,











βC−(θq(θ)+r)(1− β)u(T)+(λG(e x)+r)βT+(1 − β)u(w)=0 .
The JD curve under SPSAs is to the right of the JD curve under the
traditional system of severance payments, because the third term is
bigger, thus requiring a higher θ to satisfy the condition. The slope of
the JD curve is obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the above condition

























β +( q(θ)+θq0(θ))(1 − β)u(T)dθ









(1 − β)u0(w)+λg(e x)βT
h




33So, the JD curve has a positive slope.
Derivation of JC Curve under SPSA’s System:


















This condition determines de JC relation in (x,θ) space. The JC curve
with SPSAs is to the right of the JC curve under the traditional system
of severance payments, because the right hand side of the equation is
lower thus requiring a higher θ to satisfy the condition.
The slope of the JC curve is obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the
above condition with respect to e x,
−
Ã



















β (1 − G(e x))(1 − λg( g x)T
DA
< 0,
where DA =( 1− G(e x))(q(θ)+θq0(θ))(1 − β)u(T)+βC (1 − G(e x))−
((1−β)u0(w)+β)(λG(e x)+r)Cq0(θ)
(r+λ)q(θ)2 . The slope of the JC curve is ambiguous,
but it decreases with T. Thus, the JC curve with SPSAs is downward
sloping for high values of T.
Figure 2.a shows the job destruction and job creation curves in (x,θ)
space. Figure 2.b shows the job creation curves and the Beveridge
curves (BC) in (u,v) space, where the Beveridge curve is given by





34Figure 1.a: Effects of Reduction in
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Figure 1.b: Effects of Reduction in SPs
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% Men 68.7 69.6 66.63 67.19 63.3 67.95

























% Permanent Employees 90.74 77.64 89.77 75.25 88.17 73.71
% Self-employed 4.7 42.05 5.62 41.55 9.43 44.23
% Firm Size 2-5
Employees
11.06 35.73 11.17 35.0 13.14 31.76
% Firm Size 6-10
Employees
9.45 10.0 8.36 8.89 8.52 8.34
% Firm Size > 10
Employees
74.79 12.21 74.84 14.58 68.91 15.67
N 7,756 8,279 7,264 7,096 7,848 6,057
Notes: The table reports means and percentages.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  See text for definitions of workers
covered and not covered by severance payments.38
Table 2: Effects of SPSAs on Hourly Wages and Weekly Hours,
Differences-in-differences-in-differences Estimates
All Workers Permanent Temporary
Third-level Interaction
with SP and Short Tenure (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)














































































































Other Covariates NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
City Dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Industry Dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Notes: The table reports the coefficient on the third-level interaction in equation (1).  The rows labeled Post-1990 report results of
specifications including third-level interactions with a Post-1990 dummy which takes the value of one if the individual is observed
in 1992 or 1996 and zero otherwise.  The rows labeled 1992 and 1996 report results of specifications including third-level
interactions with separate 1992 and 1996 dummies.  All regressions include main effects and second order interactions.  The
additional covariates in Columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9) include: dummies for sex and marital status, education, experience and
experience squared, firm size dummies for firms with 2-5 employees, 6-10 employees, and more than 10 employees, and a
permanent dummy for the pooled specification.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.39
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, LSMS Data











Monthly Consumption in Food



































Monthly Severance Payments 174,261.7
(559,768.1)
_


















% Men 68.72 62.37


















Notes: The table reports means and percentages.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.40
Table 4: Effects of SPSAs on Consumption Expenditures,































































































Notes: The table reports the coefficients on monthly severance payments in monthly severance payments interacted with a post-1990
hired dummy (as specified in equation (2) in the text).  Dependent variables are: total monthly consumption expenditures in column
(1), monthly food expenditures at home in column (2), monthly expenditures in food away from home end entertainment in column
(3), monthly clothing expenditures in column (4), monthly expenditures housing services in column (5), monthly expenditures in
housing durables in column (6), expenditures in utilities in column (7), and expenditures in mortgage payments and rent in column
(8).  All regressions include: dummies for sex and marital status, education, age, experience, number of household members, monthly
household income, and a post-1990 hired dummy.  Panel A presents estimates for non-employed heads and Panel B presents estimates
for employed heads.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.41
Table 5: Effects of SPSAs on Other Forms of Insurance,






















































Notes: The table reports the coefficients on monthly severance payments and on monthly severance payments interacted
with a post-1990 hired dummy (as specified in equation (2) in the text).  Dependent variables are: monthly in-kind
transfers from relatives in column (1), monthly monetary transfers from relatives in column (2), other monthly
government-mandated transfers (i.e., disability insurance, and workers’ compensation insurance against work injuries)
in column (3), and wealth flows (i.e., interest on loans, savings accounts, or treasury bonds; dividends on stocks;
income received from lease or sale of property) in column (4).  All regressions include: dummies for sex and marital
status, education, age, experience, number of household members, monthly household income, and a post 1990 hired
dummy.  Panel A presents estimates for non-employed heads and Panel B presents estimates for employed heads.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.